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Introduction 
 
Is value the holy grail for every company? Definitely it is something executives, investors 
and researchers are interested in since decades.   If we only look at 4 major strategy 
journals over the last 20 years (Strategic Management Journal, California Management 
Review, Harvard Business Review and Sloan Management Review), together they 
published 189 articles with the word value in the title, meaning that on average about 
every month a new article was published focusing on the concept.   
 
Yet, value is perhaps one of the most used and misused terms in the history of 
management literature. To say the least, a lot of confusion persists not only about the 
meaning of the term, even more about ways to achieve it in a sustainable way.   
 
In this article, we start from a clear distinction between value creation and value 
capturing and propose a simple and intuitive framework showing the critical role of 
managing the interaction and the dynamics between these two strategic imperatives for 
achieving sustainable success for any company. We illustrate the framework with recent 
data from companies across a variety of industries providing further support for the 
relevance of the model.  
 
The Value Creation – Value Capturing framework (VC2) 
 
We define value creation as the perceived benefit to the customer.  This is in line with 
the  microeconomic concept of the utility of a company’s offering for its customers, 
whether it enhances the quality of life for a final consumer (B2C) or increases the 
profitability of a company (B2B).  If a product or service is failing to do so, obviously 
there is no point in bringing it to the market after all.  
 
Offering a useful product or service alone is not sufficient.  The pricing and cost 
structures will have to accommodate sufficient value capturing1. The provider has to 
generate sufficient revenue and profits for its shareholders. If the value created by a 
private enterprise is not sufficiently captured, there is no long term viability of the 
offering.  Zooming in on the distinction and interaction of these two dimensions of value 
creation and value capturing, leads us to the following dynamic model2 which is to be 
seen as a framework to help us understand the strategic challenge affecting a company’s 
situation in a given market or industry. 
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margins will be under pressure and provide a wake-up call, leading probably to some 
strategic reflection and reaction.  In reality, however, inertia often takes over, and the 
tension between short term optimization and long-term strategic change often resolved 
to the benefit of the former.  The eternal fear of “cannibalization” clearly fits into this 
mold. 
 
Furthermore, a variety of stop-gap measures are at their disposal to try and avert or at 
least delay the immediate pressures, potentially aggravating the eventual crisis in the 
making. Such measures appear in different shapes and forms: price-fixing, colluding or 
forming cartels, smuggling in hidden price increases3 or – just the opposite – cutting 
prices in panic mode; cost-cutting and restructurings (without a cost-based strategy); 
the usual suspects of “cross-selling” (even when the customer may not be interested in 
“cross buying”), “one stop shopping” (even when the customer does not stop) or “value 
added services” (without any value added); targeting “customer lock-in” rather than 
creating true loyalty based on superior customer value; lobbying for more regulation; 
and last but not least: mergers and acquisitions aimed at buying the competition rather 
than beating them (in the name of economies of scale, synergies or “industry 
consolidation”) just to name a few (all variations on what we call playing the “horizontal 
game”, moving sideways in the lower part of the model). 
 
Sooner or later defensive measures may not suffice to avert the fate of customer, 
competitive or public pressures, pushing further towards the lower left corner: this is 
“hell”!  It is characterized by commoditization i.e. low value creation as well as low value 
capturing (often referred to also as “commodity hell”, “the commodity trap” or “the 
commodity magnet”4 ).  This may be the plight or the final stage of companies in 
declining industries before they end up in bankruptcy (e.g. American Airlines) or being 
taken over (e.g. Nokia’s handset business). 
 
Climbing out of Hell 
 
The only way out of this situation is to start (re)focusing on creating more customer 
value by making the offering more convincing towards customers.  Such re-orientation 
requires climbing the wall of innovation, represented by an upward move along the 
vertical axis of our model, perhaps the  most important strategic priority ever as stated 
for example by former CEO Samuel Palmisano from IBM: “Either you innovate or you are 
in commodity hell”.5 
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Creating and innovating value to customers of course requires hard work and long-term 
investments.  They are at the heart of strategic success, or at least the ultimate source 
or key driver of it.  And, as recent studies have argued and illustrated, and some based 
on empirical evidence, there are only two ways to consistently add and create value 
successfully: either by becoming the low(est)-price champion (requiring continuous “cost 
innovation)” or by focusing on superior customer value (aiming for high price, requiring 
continuous value innovation)6.  
  
Simply put: unless you intend and manage to become the Wal-Mart or the Ryanair of 
your industry offering the lowest – and ever lower – prices, your strategy should aim to 
continuously offer better value – better than before, and better than competitors.  Some 
of the most recent findings seem to support the view that focusing on value in most 
cases is the better way to go, rather than on price7.  This allows capturing some of that 
value by way of higher prices, while the low-price strategy should allow capturing more 
thanks to ever lower costs (and the resulting volume increases).  
 
We include here any kind of value innovation, covering the full spectrum from marginal 
to radical or disruptive improvements in products, services or the business model8, as 
long as they create additional value to the customer.  It may be noted in passing that the 
now so popular term of “disruptive” innovation in fact unduly reveals some defensive or 
inward-looking bias, as in our view there is nothing disruptive or being disrupted for the 
customer or consumer, only new opportunities and value added and the potential 
disruption refers in the first place to the company offering it or being affected by the new 
offering that risks being ‘disrupted’9. 
 
It should be clear that value is created at the level of a company, not at the level of an 
industry as Ted Levitt aptly argued now more than 50 years ago in his seminal article 
“Market Myopia”:  “In truth, there is no such thing as a growth industry, I believe. There 
are only companies organized and operated to create and capitalize on growth 
opportunities.”10 Since then it has also been repeatedly shown in a host of studies and 
approaches that industry and other external factors in fact only explain only a small part 
of the profitability variation across firms11, much in line with this perspective. 
 
From Nightmare to Heaven 
 
Value creation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustained superior 
performance.  If all you do is deliver value to customers and not keep enough in the 
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process you are obviously not in a good place, a situation that looks like a “nightmare”: 
you work really hard at it, but do not get rewarded.   
 
Such seems to be the situation of some established  companies that manage to come up 
with innovations that customers value but are not (yet) able to reap their benefits, 
because of an ineffective business model or defective value proposition particularly in 
highly competitive conditions (e.g. Philips).   
 
Most if not all startups share this challenge. They may have large amounts of “eyeballs” 
(see the dotcom bubble of 2000 or Facebook till recently) or even buyers (e.g. Amazon) 
but little or no profit and can only survive as long as the investors keep holding faith that 
sooner or later they will get handsomely rewarded (and thus move over to the upper 
right as Facebook is). 
 
By no means are we claiming that only later should we worry about value capturing, 
since it may be hard to convince customers to start paying (more) later.  As a principle it 
seems that we should be able to align our pricing as much and as closely as possible with 
the specific value bundle or value proposition we are offering.  Paypal for instance 
managed to adapt its pricing structure gradually in line with the features it was adding 
over time and this may be at least one of the reasons for its success where other have 
failed12  When you are able to do just that, you are well on the way to “heaven”.  
 
Capturing value means that you should be able to turn your value creation (as realized in 
a concrete value proposition) into a sustainable business, by means of what we usually 
call a “business model” Strategy scholar David Teece for instance put it like this: “The 
essence of a business model is in defining the manner by which the enterprise delivers 
value to customers, entices customers to pay for value, and converts those payments to 
profit”.13  This is the point where pricing becomes crucial14: the means to capture a  
share of the value created to assure sustainability by providing return and resources for 
further investment. 
  
Nike is such a company that succeeded in creating more value for its customers by 
approaching sequentially different sports through a “category offense”15 strategy while 
focusing strongly on the customer experience rather than on the functional benefits.  
Although at a lower level of both value creation and value capturing than Nike, Singapore 
Airlines as well as Southwest Airlines or Ryanair at the other end of the spectrum 
outperform their direct competitors on both dimensions thanks to a clear and ever 
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improving value proposition, remaining very profitable in a harsh industry and economic 
environment. 
 
In so doing we can arrive in “heaven” at last – however it is not a heaven where you can 
sit back and relax.  Even though the temptation will be there, especially when you have 
been successful and you have created your new product, market, industry and gained a 
respectable position, you cannot rest on your laurels. As more and more markets and 
cases show, there hardly ever exists an inherently sustainable advantage. Ultimately 
sustainability will result from our ability to constantly innovate, uphold and improve our 
value (proposition) to the customer (as increasingly illustrated and argued, e.g.  in the 
recent contributions on “transient advantage”16 and “repeatability”17). 
 
If you focus too much on the value capturing at the expenses of continued value 
creation, you risk of falling into the trap of “the failure of success”. Most companies have 
encountered this at some point in time, and many of them have not been able to keep up 
their position or the record of success.  For instance, only 13.4% of the companies that 
were in the Fortune top 500 in 1955 are still there today18 and the average number of 
years a company survives on that same list is now less than 15 years19.    
 
There seems to be a certain “law of gravity” which pulls us invariably down from heaven, 
by weakening our relative value creation efforts and putting us to sleep (in the dream 
scenario), as we become too focused on optimizing the capturing (reflected in misleading 
metrics like percentages margin, market share etc.) We may even increase our 
capturing, while our value creation is going down, by milking, harvesting, improving 
short-term financial results, while cutting investments and losing sight of future value 
creation, until de-regulation, anti-trust, and/or new competitors show up pushing us into 
the defensive, and eventually challenging our survival. 
 
This type of movement can occur very quickly as shown by recent examples such as 
Nokia and Blackberry in the mobile phone handset business, and it seems that the time 
between the comfortable “dream” and a scramble for survival in “hell” has been shrinking 
at a rapid pace, particularly in those areas where new technologies (and internet-based 
models that often exhibit “winner-takes-all” features) increasingly dominate. Our 
empirical results below on a large group of Fortune 500 companies illustrate and 
elaborate on these points. 
The dynamic picture 
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In sum, looking back at Fig. 1, for existing companies there is a natural clockwise flow 
from the dream (lower right box) to the heaven (upper left box) through the 
intermediate stages of hell and nightmare.  From dream to hell we are pushed by the 
inability to react to competitive or regulatory pressure.  Successful companies find new 
ways to create value for their customers and move vertically.  If they also succeed in 
monetizing their offering the shift towards heaven will occur. Once arrived in the heaven 
situation, continuous improvement is needed in order not to become complacent and 
resist the continuous temptation of slipping into a dream.   
 
Most successful new entrants enter in the upper left: they found a new way to create 
value for a number of customers who appreciate and are buying the product or services.  
Unfortunately, quite a lot of these companies (even large ones like Amazon) do not 
immediately succeed to extract a substantial profit from their offering and risk to 
disappear if they do not deliver or manage to uphold investors’ expectations.  
 
This tension between creation and capturing culminates to the point where we realize 
that the only reliable way to know and test whether we are actually are creating 
sufficient value remains… whether we are able to capture (enough of) it in the wake of 
increasing competition.  It is therefore not even “willingness to pay” but ultimately 
whatever the customer is actually paying or has paid for, that matters most.  
Measuring value creation and value capturing 
While our framework is essentially conceptual, and at first sight perhaps no more than a 
formalized “metaphor”, we can illustrate it empirically with actual data from major 
companies across a variety of industries.   
 
Even though clearly there are no “perfect” measures for both axes, we propose a simple 
methodology to quantify the dimensions of value capturing and value creation at 
company, yielding rather illuminating and sensible results supporting the key messages 
and interpretations of our model. 
 
For value capturing we refer to known measures of profit or profitability.  For our 
purpose, and since we are interested in operational results rather than financial leverage, 
we use net profit divided by total assets as an indication of how much value (profit) a 
firm is able to extract from the used resources (assets). It is a broadly used measure, is 
relatively robust to financial market fluctuations or financing strategies20 and can be used 
for comparisons with other studies. 
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In the above scatter graph we grouped the firms into 18 industries or sectors21 (Fig. 3).  
The X-axis represents Return on Assets as a measure of Value Capturing, and the Y-axis 
represents Brand Value over Revenues as a measure of Value Creation.  For each sector 
we provide the companies’ position at the start of the observed period (2008) and at the 
end (2012), with arrows indicating the sense of the movement over this period. 
 
Clearly companies in sectors like Airlines, Telecom, Tires and Rubber and Conglomerates 
seem to be struggling in “hell” (bottom right), more recently joined by those in Retail, 
while Pharma, Cable and of course Oil companies seem to be more favorably positioned 
in the “dream” scenario, indeed sectors that are traditionally characterized by a limited 
competition (thus relatively less pressure to innovate and create value as a condition for 
their continued value capturing).  Companies in Apparel, Food and Beverage, Personal 
Care, as well as Internet and Software seem to be much higher up (upper left).   
 
At this aggregate level, it seems significant to observe that the majority of companies 
have been moving down on both the value capturing and the value creation dimension 
over the period observed, in what is probably a very clear manifestation of the “economic 
crisis” during these times.   Not only has value capturing clearly suffered during the crisis 
it may be seen just as well as a crisis of value creation. 
  
The slashing of investments in innovation, R&D, management development, and the 
coinciding hoarding of cash especially on the balance sheets of most large established 
companies is undoubtedly related to this general drop in value creation.  In only few 
industries in our sample were companies able to increase both their value created and 
captured over this period of time (see companies in logistics, aerospace & defense, 
rubber and cable). 
 
Far more interesting is it to zoom in on the situation and the movements of individual 
companies over the given period, as illustrated next. 
 
Specific companies within their respective industries 
a. Retail Companies 
 
As noted above, most retail companies seem to be struggling in “hell” as shown in Fig. 4 
below.  Two of the main contenders in the US, Wal-Mart and Target are doing 
significantly better than their main competitors, the latter scoring somewhat higher on 
the value creation dimension.  Tesco that was up in heaven showed early signs of 
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Conclusion: Strategy, Value creation and “the Einstein issue”. 
Value creation and value capturing have increasingly been targeted in discussions and 
publications on strategic management.  Given the increasing and increasingly fast-
moving competitive pressures across markets and industries, and the search for renewed 
economic growth, especially since the financial crisis, the need for (re)focusing on the 
creation part of the equation has never been greater and more apparent.  The data 
shown for leading companies across a variety of industries support and illustrate this 
point as well as the resulting strategic challenge. 
We would argue that “The more competitive your business, the less you should focus on 
the competition.” It is your capacity to continuously innovate and add value to the 
customer that will determine strategic success and that will decide whether you will be 
able to ‘beat your competition’ in the process. This view is clearly in line with (the need 
for and recent publications about) the required shift in strategic focus for most if not all 
companies from defensive or ‘value capturing’ tactics towards creating and maintaining 
the key conditions for sustained value creation. 
Creating value in a sustained way (a better, cheaper or faster offering than that of the 
competitors) is a key condition for sustained capturing.  Yet, we do not have equally 
generally accepted measures for value creation as those generally used and accepted for 
the capturing part, if only because ‘value’ is an elusive and multi-dimensional concept 
that greatly varies with time, place and relevant customers, users or citizens.  
In this paper we reverted to a carefully constructed and multi-dimensional concept of 
brand value as an adequate proxy for value creation towards the customer.  It is up to 
the customer to decide what is compelling and what is not and to what value is attributed 
after all. At the end of the day, these decisions of the company and its customers 
determine what value is attributed, what price is charged and how much profit will result.  
This goes back to what we like to call the “Einstein issue” inspired by the famous quote: 
“Not everything that counts gets counted, and not everything that’s counted, counts.”  
Perhaps no better and succinct summary of the key strategic challenge facing any 
company (and other non-profit or public organizations alike22).  As long as organizations 
do not fully embrace the key strategic challenge of addressing both dimensions and their 
interaction, sustained success and economic growth will remain elusive. 
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Appendix : Data sources and Methodology 
 
We started from the largest 500 brands in the world as calculated by Brandfinance 
(Brandfinance, 2014). Brandfinance uses a royalty relief methodology as described by 
ISO 10668. Such a methodology has numerous advantages, including taking into account 
industry specific valuations and is accepted by fiscal authorities23.   
 
The brand value obtained through this methodology is the result of the product of “brand 
strength index”, a royalty rate and revenues attributed to the brand.  Underlying the 
brand strength index are 30 attributes that represent different stakeholders (customers, 
staff, financial and external). We focused on brands that were amongst these largest 
brands in 2012 and/or 2008 – as we are also interested in how companies evolve. We 
added available brand values for companies owing multiple large brands.  It is to be 
noted that as such smaller brands are neglected and the brand portfolio is not necessarily 
the same for all companies in all years. 
 
For the financial data we referred to the Thomson Reuters database that collects data of 
companies that publish their financial results.  As such private companies were excluded 
from the dataset.  Industries in which most of the companies manage a portfolio of 
unrelated brands like tobacco or packaged foods were not withheld. We also excluded 
banks, mainly because their key financial metrics are different and by their mere size, 
including them would skew the averages on these metrics. If reporting currency is other 
than USD, figures were translated by Thomson Reuters EIKON to USD using the fiscal 
year end date exchange rate.   
 
In the end, we considered 18 industries consisting of the same 119 companies in 2008 
and 2012. These companies owned in 2012 in total $10,087 Bio assets, made $563 Bio 
of profits and had a combined brand value was $1,301 Bio. 
 
As a proxy for value creation we use the brand value as explained above, which we 
divide by revenues to correct for size but also as it seemed to us the most logical from a 
value creation perspective: how much value does the customer attributes (brand value) 
for his or her money spend (revenues). We use a one year time-lag between the brand 
value and the financial data. The logic behind this approach is that the value created at 
the beginning of the year is compared with the value captured throughout the year. The 
proxy we use for value capturing is profit/assets. The net profit, divided by the total 
asset gives a good representation of potential shareholder return.  
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Number of companies across different industries. 
 
Industry  Total Assets 
Number of 
Companies 
Aerospace & Defense 
  
312.877                  5  
Airlines 
  
122.630                  4  
Apparel 
  
59.628                  5  
Cable 
  
211.557                  4  
Communications Equipment 
  
205.262                  4  
Conglomerates 
  
1.051.172                  6  
Integrated Oil & Gas 
  
2.731.697               11  
IT Consultancy & Other Services 
  
185.508                  4  
Logistics 
  
113.415                  3  
Movies & Entertainment 
  
222.115                  4  
Personal Products 
  
69.027                  5  
Pharma 
  
569.536                  5  
Restaurants & Soft Drinks 
  
204.418                  4  
Software 
  
258.064                  5  
Supermarkets 
  
676.795               13  
Technology Hardware & Consumer Electronics 
  
752.136               11  
Telecommunication Services 
  
2.260.375               23  
Tires & Rubber 
  
80.464                  3  
Total 
  
10.086.676             119  
 
Total 2012 assets in Mio of USD 
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